Remedial aims accord with the result compelled by the statute’s plain language: RISAĮncompasses services contracts. Purposes that undergird RISA and the principles of interpretation appropriate to its 17:16C-1(b) does not call for aĭifferent result or limit the variety of services contracts to which RISA applies. Of examples offered in the second sentence of N.J.S.A. Those provisions clearly state that RISA applies to contracts for services, and the list at (s), and its definitions ofīoth “retail seller” and “retail buyer” include sellers and buyers of services, id. RISA also includes a definition of “services,” id. Pay the retail purchase price of goods or services.” N.J.S.A. The definition of “retail installment contract” states that it includes “an agreement to
The language used by the Legislature reveals that RISA applies to contracts for servicesĪnd does not include the requirement of a financing arrangement. at 29-30.Īpplying the principles of statutory construction to the relevant RISA provisions, theĬourt does not agree with the result reached by the Appellate Division here or in Mellet. That RISA does not apply to health club membership contracts. In Mellet, the Appellate Division relied on Perez in determining 188 (2006), provides helpful guidance but does not address Require a financing charge are questions of first impression before the Court. Whether any of those provisions preclude RISA’s application to services contracts or Pursuant to a retail installment contract,” id. at (c),Īnd “a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or services from a retail seller. To sell goods or services under a retail installment contract. at (s), andĭefines “Retail seller” and “Retail buyer,” respectively, as “a person who sells or agrees RISA also includes its own definition of “Services,” id. Installments over a period of time” and specifies that the “term includes a securityĪgreement, chattel mortgage, conditional sales contract, or other similar instrument.”
between a retail seller and a retail buyer evidencing anĪgreement to pay the retail purchase price of goods or services. The Court looks to the plain language of RISA, which defines a “Retail installmentĬontract” as “any contract. Written, there is no requirement that a contract include a financing arrangement to beġ. HELD: By its terms, RISA applies to services contracts. That no financing arrangement was present in Fitness Factory’s membership contract, theĪppellate court held that RISA did not apply. Purview, a contract for the sale of goods or services must involve financing.” Finding The Appellate Division affirmed, explaining that, “to fall within RISA’s 2017), that RISA does not apply to services contracts. TheĬourt based its decision on the determination in Mellet v.
#FITNESS FACTORY TRIAL#
The trial court dismissed the complaint in its entirety. Sanchez brought a class action complaint alleging that the imposition of the Months, Sanchez ended his membership without issue. Sanchez opted for theįunds transfer membership and paid the initiation fee. Second option were required to pay an “initiation fee” of $29.99. The second was referred to as the “Electronic Funds Transfer” option, whichĪllowed the member to make monthly payments.
#FITNESS FACTORY FULL#
The first option was payment in full upon signing theĬontract. In March 2013, Plaintiff Henry Sanchez joined the Fitness Factory gym inĮdgewater and signed the club’s membership contract, which provided for twoĪlternative payment methods.
The Court considers those determinations. The Appellate Division found that RISA applies only to contracts that contain a financingĪrrangement. While acknowledging that RISA applies to some services contracts, RISA did not apply to the contract because it was a contract for services. The trial court dismissed Sanchez’s complaint, finding that He contends that the “initiationįee” charged in defendant Fitness Factory’s gym membership contract, among other Plaintiff Henry Sanchez brings this class action seeking relief based on the Retail Fitness Factory Edgewater, LLC (A-93-18) (082834)įERNANDEZ-VINA, J., writing for the Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by theĬourt. It has been prepared by the Office of theĬlerk for the convenience of the reader. This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion.
0 kommentar(er)
